Saudi-Arabië stuurt leger naar Bahrein

Saudi-Arabië en de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten hebben gisteren troepen naar Bahrein gestuurd om er de regering te helpen de opstand van de sjiitische bevolking neer te slaan.

Bahrein is militair belangrijk. De vijfde vloot van de Amerikaanse zeemacht heeft er haar thuisbasis. Bovendien wordt zowel Bahrein als buurland Saudi-Arabië door soennieten geregeerd. Een val van het regime in Bahrein kan onrust in Saudi-Arabië veroorzaken, zeker in het olierijke oosten, waar de sjiieten in de meerderheid zijn.

De regering in Bahrein riep gisteren de hulp in van alle Golfstaten. Verder afgelegen Golflanden als Oman en Qatar reageerden tot nader order niet. Saudi-Arabië stuurde 1.000 soldaten, de Emiraten 500 politieagenten.

De agenten en soldaten hebben de opdracht de financiële instellingen en de olie- en gasinstallaties te bewaken. Zondag waren er hevige gevechten tussen de opstandelingen en de Bahreinse politie, waarbij de politie zich moest terugtrekken en jongeren het financieel district probeerden te barricaderen.

De sjiitische oppositie in Bahrein reageerde in een persmededeling dat ze de buitenlandse troepen als bezetters ziet. ‘De inval brengt de bevolking van Bahrein in ernstig gevaar en bedreigt hen met een onverklaarde oorlog door buitenlandse troepen.’

Iran en Libië

Ook elders in het Midden-Oosten wordt de repressie harder. De VN meldden gisteren dat Iran de executies van politieke tegenstanders opschroeft.

In Libië gaat de door kolonel Muammar Khadaffi ontketende oorlog tussen hem en de bevolking voort. Plannen om een no-flyzone af te dwingen om de bombardementen op burgers te stoppen, bleken ook gisteren te ver gegrepen. Turkije blokkeert in de NAVO een initiatief in die zin.

Gisteravond laat vergaderden de ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken van de G8-landen. Er werd vooral uitgekeken naar het standpunt van Rusland, dat zich tot nu toe tegen een no-flyzone kantte. Dat de Russische president

Dmitri Medvedev gisteren de familie Khadaffi de toegang tot Rusland ontzegde, werd als een signaal gezien dat de kloof tussen de visie van Rusland en die van de westerse landen aan het verkleinen is.

( / 14.03.2011)

Another dead freedom fighter in Libya. This one was family.

Muhannad O. Bensadik, finger raised, stood joyful with his best friend Ahmed and others in liberated Benghazi, Libya, in Martyrs Square March 1. On March 12 he became a martyr himself when he was killed by government forces outside Brega, 140 miles from Benghazi.

I never met Muhanned O. Bensadik. And now I never will. He was my step-daughter’s cousin. He was killed by pro-Gaddafi forces in their attack on rebel-held Brega, a port city on the southeastern coast of the Gulf of Sidra. On March 4, in my diary here and above, he appears smiling, looking into the camera as young men and boys swarm over a liberated tank in Benghazi.

He was raised in Libya. But he was an American citizen, born in Eden, N.C., on Oct. 9, 1989. Summers he often spent in his mother’s speck of a hometown, Martinsville, Va. In fourth grade, he attended school all year there. His two sisters, 12 and 8, still live there with his mother. His brother and father live in Benghazi.

From age 7, he was in the Libyan Boy Scouts and when he got older he became a troop leader. He was a fan of the blues, of Bob Marley and Tupac Shakur. His favorite novel was of the French Revolution, A Tale of Two Cities. His favorite movies included Saving Private Ryan and Eclipse (of the Twilight series). He loved The Simpsons, South Park and Happy Tree Friends.

He studied taekwondo, was an avid swimmer and enjoyed spear-fishing. His hobby was photography. He graduated from high school in 2007 and wanted to study mechanical engineering in the United States. But he never got here.

He was a generous boy. He often helped feed the poor in Benghazi during Ramadan. And when he first joined the rebels surging out of Benghazi, headed ultimately, they hoped, to Tripoli to free their country from murderous tyranny, he helped pass out food to people after Ajdabiya was liberated. Somewhere between there and the port of Ras Lanouf, he acquired a rifle and some basic training.

Here he is being briefly interviewed by Al Jazeera in Ras Lanouf, starting about 0:45:

After describing the situation in Ras Lanouf on March 6, Al Jazeera reporter Hassan abu al-Hassan questions an enthusiatic Muhannad (speaking English):

Hassan: There is brutal fighting going on in Ras Lanouf.Muhannad: Gaddafi’s battalions are shooting from the military ships from the sea, and from tanks on the mountains and by missiles from behind.

Here is an interview with him on CNN on March 6.

Six days after this interview, Muhannad and four friends, including Ahmed, were caught in an attack just northeast of Brega. They split up and ran, three and two. Muhannad and another friend disappeared. Ahmed and the other two escaped. Muhannad was shot dead. We don’t know whether his friend was. His father, who was injured near Brega and is now in the hospital in Benghazi, has not been able to recover Muhannad’s body.Here is an audio link to a comment today in English from Muhannad’s father to a supporter of my step-daughter’s anti-Gaddafi dissident group. He explains what happened as he was told. There is a transcript and an Arabic translation here.

Meanwhile, Gaddafi’s forces march on. Today, they are bribing people in Brega with 500 dinars to fight the passionate but poorly armed, poorly trained rebels, most of them civilians until February 15 when an arrest of the dissident Fatih Tarbel sparked the revolt. The dictator, Brother Leader he calls himself, pays Libyans to kill Libyans so he can continue his rule.

If Gaddafi succeeds, if he regains full control, everything we know about him indicates a quiet bloodbath will take place. He will have plenty of time and plenty of money. At risk is every Libyan who has protested, has joined dissident Facebook groups, has put up a YouTube video, or has spoken to Al Jazeera. As well as the families of those who have done these things.

As the international community slowly discusses whether to take up the Arab League’s requesting a no-fly zone, many Muhannads are dying. If nobody answers their plea, many more will.


Muhannad poses with his catch last August in the Mediterranean near Benghazi.

( / 14.03.2011)

The Cost of Israel to US Taxpayers

For many years the American media said that “Israel receives $1.8 billion in military aid” or that “Israel receives $1.2 billion in economic aid.” Both statements were true, but since they were never combined to give us the complete total of annual U.S. aid to Israel, they also were lies—true lies.

Recently Americans have begun to read and hear that “Israel receives $3 billion in annual U.S. foreign aid.” That’s true. But it’s still a lie. The problem is that in fiscal 1997 alone, Israel received from a variety of other U.S. federal budgets at least $525.8 million above and beyond its $3 billion from the foreign aid budget, and yet another $2 billion in federal loan guarantees. So the complete total of U.S. grants and loan guarantees to Israel for fiscal 1997 was $5,525,800,000.

One can truthfully blame the mainstream media for never digging out these figures for themselves, because none ever have. They were compiled by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. But the mainstream media certainly are not alone. Although Congress authorizes America’s foreign aid total, the fact that more than a third of it goes to a country smaller in both area and population than Hong Kong probably never has been mentioned on the floor of the Senate or House. Yet it’s been going on for more than a generation.

Probably the only members of Congress who even suspect the full total of U.S. funds received by Israel each year are the privileged few committee members who actually mark it up. And almost all members of the concerned committees are Jewish, have taken huge campaign donations orchestrated by Israel’s Washington, DC lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), or both. These congressional committee members are paid to act, not talk. So they do and they don’t.

The same applies to the president, the secretary of state, and the foreign aid administrator. They all submit a budget that includes aid for Israel, which Congress approves, or increases, but never cuts. But no one in the executive branch mentions that of the few remaining U.S. aid recipients worldwide, all of the others are developing nations which either make their military bases available to the U.S., are key members of international alliances in which the U.S. participates, or have suffered some crippling blow of nature to their abilities to feed their people such as earthquakes, floods or droughts.

Israel, whose troubles arise solely from its unwillingness to give back land it seized in the 1967 war in return for peace with its neighbors, does not fit those criteria. In fact, Israel’s 1995 per capita gross domestic product was $15,800. That put it below Britain at $19,500 and Italy at $18,700 and just above Ireland at $15,400 and Spain at $14,300.

All four of those European countries have contributed a very large share of immigrants to the U.S., yet none has organized an ethnic group to lobby for U.S. foreign aid. Instead, all four send funds and volunteers to do economic development and emergency relief work in other less fortunate parts of the world.

The lobby that Israel and its supporters have built in the United States to make all this aid happen, and to ban discussion of it from the national dialogue, goes far beyond AIPAC, with its $15 million budget, its 150 employees, and its five or six registered lobbyists who manage to visit every member of Congress individually once or twice a year.

AIPAC, in turn, can draw upon the resources of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, a roof group set up solely to coordinate the efforts of some 52 national Jewish organizations on behalf of Israel.

Among them are Hadassah, the Zionist women’s organization, which organizes a steady stream of American Jewish visitors to Israel; the American Jewish Congress, which mobilizes support for Israel among members of the traditionally left-of-center Jewish mainstream; and the American Jewish Committee, which plays the same role within the growing middle-of-the-road and right-of-center Jewish community. The American Jewish Committee also publishes Commentary, one of the Israel lobby’s principal national publications.

Perhaps the most controversial of these groups is B’nai B’rith’s Anti-Defamation League. Its original highly commendable purpose was to protect the civil rights of American Jews. Over the past generation, however, the ADL has regressed into a conspiratorial and, with a $45 million budget, extremely well funded hate group.

In the 1980s, during the tenure of chairman Seymour Reich, who went on to become chairman of the Conference of Presidents, ADL was found to have circulated two annual fund-raising letters warning Jewish parents against allegedly negative influences on their children arising from the increasing Arab presence on American university campuses.

More recently, FBI raids on ADL’s Los Angeles and San Francisco offices revealed that an ADL operative had purchased files stolen from the San Francisco police department that a court had ordered destroyed because they violated the civil rights of the individuals on whom they had been compiled. ADL, it was shown, had added the illegally prepared and illegally obtained material to its own secret files, compiled by planting informants among Arab-American, African-American, anti-Apartheid and peace and justice groups.

The ADL infiltrators took notes of the names and remarks of speakers and members of audiences at programs organized by such groups. ADL agents even recorded the license plates of persons attending such programs and then suborned corrupt motor vehicles department employees or renegade police officers to identify the owners.

Although one of the principal offenders fled the United States to escape prosecution, no significant penalties were assessed. ADL’s Northern California office was ordered to comply with requests by persons upon whom dossiers had been prepared to see their own files, but no one went to jail and as yet no one has paid fines.

Not surprisingly, a defecting employee revealed in an article he published in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs that AIPAC, too, has such “enemies” files. They are compiled for use by pro-Israel journalists like Steven Emerson and other so-called “Terrorism experts,” and also by professional, academic or journalistic rivals of the persons described for use in blacklisting, defaming, or denouncing them. What is never revealed is that AIPAC’s “opposition research“ department, under the supervision of Michael Lewis, son of famed Princeton University Orientalist Bernard Lewis, is the source of this defamatory material.

But this is not AIPAC’s most controversial activity. In the 1970s, when Congress put a cap on the amount its members could earn from speakers’ fees and book royalties over and above their salaries, it halted AIPAC’s most effective ways of paying off members for voting according to AIPAC recommendations. Members of AIPAC’s national board of directors solved the problem by returning to their home states and creating political action committees (PACs).

Most special interests have PACs, as do many major corporations, labor unions, trade associations and public-interest groups. But the pro-Israel groups went wild. To date some 126 pro-Israel PACs have been registered, and no fewer than 50 have been active in every national election over the past generation.

An individual voter can give up to $2,000 to a candidate in an election cycle, and a PAC can give a candidate up to $10,000. However, a single special interest with 50 PACs can give a candidate who is facing a tough opponent, and who has voted according to its recommendations, up to half a million dollars. That’s enough to buy all the television time needed to get elected in most parts of the country.

Even candidates who don’t need this kind of money certainly don’t want it to become available to a rival from their own party in a primary election, or to an opponent from the opposing party in a general election. As a result, all but a handful of the 535 members of the Senate and House vote as AIPAC instructs when it comes to aid to Israel, or other aspects of U.S. Middle East policy.

There is something else very special about AIPAC’s network of political action committees. Nearly all have deceptive names. Who could possibly know that the Delaware Valley Good Government Association in Philadelphia, San Franciscans for Good Government in California, Cactus PAC in Arizona, Beaver PAC in Wisconsin, and even Icepac in New York are really pro-Israel PACs under deep cover?

Hiding AIPAC’s Tracks

In fact, the congress members know it when they list the contributions they receive on the campaign statements they have to prepare for the Federal Election Commission. But their constituents don’t know this when they read these statements. So just as no other special interest can put so much “hard money” into any candidate’s election campaign as can the Israel lobby, no other special interest has gone to such elaborate lengths to hide its tracks.

Although AIPAC, Washington’s most feared special-interest lobby, can hide how it uses both carrots and sticks to bribe or intimidate members of Congress, it can’t hide all of the results.

Anyone can ask one of their representatives in Congress for a chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service, a branch of the Library of Congress, that shows Israel received $62.5 billion in foreign aid from fiscal year 1949 through fiscal year 1996. People in the national capital area also can visit the library of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Rosslyn, Virginia, and obtain the same information, plus charts showing how much foreign aid the U.S. has given other countries as well.

Visitors will learn that in precisely the same 1949-1996 time frame, the total of U.S. foreign aid to all of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean combined was $62,497,800,000–almost exactly the amount given to tiny Israel.

According to the Population Reference Bureau of Washington, DC, in mid-1995 the sub-Saharan countries had a combined population of 568 million. The $24,415,700,000 in foreign aid they had received by then amounted to $42.99 per sub-Saharan African.

Similarly, with a combined population of 486 million, all of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean together had received $38,254,400,000. This amounted to $79 per person.

The per capita U.S. foreign aid to Israel’s 5.8 million people during the same period was $10,775.48. This meant that for every dollar the U.S. spent on an African, it spent $250.65 on an Israeli, and for every dollar it spent on someone from the Western Hemisphere outside the United States, it spent $214 on an Israeli.

Shocking Comparisons

These comparisons already seem shocking, but they are far from the whole truth. Using reports compiled by Clyde Mark of the Congressional Research Service and other sources, freelance writer Frank Collins tallied for the Washington Report all of the extra items for Israel buried in the budgets of the Pentagon and other federal agencies in fiscal year 1993.Washington Report news editor Shawn Twing did the same thing for fiscal years 1996 and 1997.

They uncovered $1.271 billion in extras in FY 1993, $355.3 million in FY 1996 and $525.8 million in FY 1997. These represent an average increase of 12.2 percent over the officially recorded foreign aid totals for the same fiscal years, and they probably are not complete. It’s reasonable to assume, therefore, that a similar 12.2 percent hidden increase has prevailed over all of the years Israel has received aid.

As of Oct. 31, 1997 Israel will have received $3.05 billion in U.S. foreign aid for fiscal year 1997 and $3.08 billion in foreign aid for fiscal year 1998. Adding the 1997 and 1998 totals to those of previous years since 1949 yields a total of $74,157,600,000 in foreign aid grants and loans. Assuming that the actual totals from other budgets average 12.2 percent of that amount, that brings the grand total to $83,204,827,200.

But that’s not quite all. Receiving its annual foreign aid appropriation during the first month of the fiscal year, instead of in quarterly installments as do other recipients, is just another special privilege Congress has voted for Israel. It enables Israel to invest the money in U.S. Treasury notes. That means that the U.S., which has to borrow the money it gives to Israel, pays interest on the money it has granted to Israel in advance, while at the same time Israel is collecting interest on the money. That interest to Israel from advance payments adds another $1.650 billion to the total, making it $84,854,827,200.That’s the number you should write down for total aid to Israel. And that’s $14,346 each for each man, woman and child in Israel.

It’s worth noting that that figure does not include U.S. government loan guarantees to Israel, of which Israel has drawn $9.8 billion to date. They greatly reduce the interest rate the Israeli government pays on commercial loans, and they place additional burdens on U.S. taxpayers, especially if the Israeli government should default on any of them. But since neither the savings to Israel nor the costs to U.S. taxpayers can be accurately quantified, they are excluded from consideration here.

Further, friends of Israel never tire of saying that Israel has never defaulted on repayment of a U.S. government loan. It would be equally accurate to say Israel has never been required to repay a U.S. government loan. The truth of the matter is complex, and designed to be so by those who seek to conceal it from the U.S. taxpayer.

Most U.S. loans to Israel are forgiven, and many were made with the explicit understanding that they would be forgiven before Israel was required to repay them. By disguising as loans what in fact were grants, cooperating members of Congress exempted Israel from the U.S. oversight that would have accompanied grants. On other loans, Israel was expected to pay the interest and eventually to begin repaying the principal. But the so-called Cranston Amendment, which has been attached by Congress to every foreign aid appropriation since 1983, provides that economic aid to Israel will never dip below the amount Israel is required to pay on its outstanding loans. In short, whether U.S. aid is extended as grants or loans to Israel, it never returns to the Treasury.

Israel enjoys other privileges. While most countries receiving U.S. military aid funds are expected to use them for U.S. arms, ammunition and training, Israel can spend part of these funds on weapons made by Israeli manufacturers. Also, when it spends its U.S. military aid money on U.S. products, Israel frequently requires the U.S. vendor to buy components or materials from Israeli manufacturers. Thus, though Israeli politicians say that their own manufacturers and exporters are making them progressively less dependent upon U.S. aid, in fact those Israeli manufacturers and exporters are heavily subsidized by U.S. aid.

Although it’s beyond the parameters of this study, it’s worth mentioning that Israel also receives foreign aid from some other countries. After the United States, the principal donor of both economic and military aid to Israel is Germany.

By far the largest component of German aid has been in the form of restitution payments to victims of Nazi atrocities. But there also has been extensive German military assistance to Israel during and since the Gulf war, and a variety of German educational and research grants go to Israeli institutions. The total of German assistance in all of these categories to the Israeli government, Israeli individuals and Israeli private institutions has been some $31 billion or $5,345 per capita, bringing the per capita total of U.S. and German assistance combined to almost $20,000 per Israeli. Since very little public money is spent on the more than 20 percent of Israeli citizens who are Muslim or Christian, the actual per capita benefits received by Israel’s Jewish citizens would be considerably higher.

True Cost to U.S. Taxpayers

Generous as it is, what Israelis actually got in U.S. aid is considerably less than what it has cost U.S. taxpayers to provide it. The principal difference is that so long as the U.S. runs an annual budget deficit, every dollar of aid the U.S. gives Israel has to be raised through U.S. government borrowing.

In an article in the Washington Report for December 1991/January 1992, Frank Collins estimated the costs of this interest, based upon prevailing interest rates for every year since 1949. I have updated this by applying a very conservative 5 percent interest rate for subsequent years, and confined the amount upon which the interest is calculated to grants, not loans or loan guarantees.

On this basis the $84.8 billion in grants, loans and commodities Israel has received from the U.S. since 1949 cost the U.S. an additional $49,936,880,000 in interest.

There are many other costs of Israel to U.S. taxpayers, such as most or all of the $45.6 billion in U.S. foreign aid to Egypt since Egypt made peace with Israel in 1979 (compared to $4.2 billion in U.S. aid to Egypt for the preceding 26 years). U.S. foreign aid to Egypt, which is pegged at two-thirds of U.S. foreign aid to Israel, averages $2.2 billion per year.

There also have been immense political and military costs to the U.S. for its consistent support of Israel during Israel’s half-century of disputes with the Palestinians and all of its Arab neighbors. In addition, there have been the approximately $10 billion in U.S. loan guarantees and perhaps $20 billion in tax-exempt contributions made to Israel by American Jews in the nearly half-century since Israel was created.

Even excluding all of these extra costs, America’s $84.8 billion in aid to Israel from fiscal years 1949 through 1998, and the interest the U.S. paid to borrow this money, has cost U.S. taxpayers $134.8 billion, not adjusted for inflation. Or, put another way, the nearly $14,630 every one of 5.8 million Israelis received from the U.S. government by Oct. 31, 1997 has cost American taxpayers $23,240 per Israeli.

It would be interesting to know how many of those American taxpayers believe they and their families have received as much from the U.S. Treasury as has everyone who has chosen to become a citizen of Israel. But it’s a question that will never occur to the American public because, so long as America’s mainstream media, Congress and president maintain their pact of silence, few Americans will ever know the true cost of Israel to U.S. taxpayers.

( / 14.03.2011)

Gaza: Protesters to sleep in Unknown Soldier Square

Gaza: Protesters to sleep in Unknown Soldier Square
Published today (updated) 14/03/2011 21:48
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GAZA CITY (Ma’an) — Gaza City’s Unknown Soldier Square is filled with Palestinian flags, mattresses, tents, stereos, speakers and banners as young Palestinians rally to end the division.

At least 3,000 protesters hit the streets today, and say they plan to sleep in the square ahead of the mass demonstration planned for March 15.

Demonstrators carried banners demanding national unity: “Sit-in, sit-in until the end of division,” “We won’t go, we won’t sleep until we end the division,” “We are united in our struggle: workers, students and farmers.”

But the most common slogan read simply, “The people want to end the division.”

“We went out in a spontaneous demonstration today from Al-Azhar University and Al-Quds Open University” Hani Abu Mustafa of the March 15 coalition told Ma’an. Word has spread and the people have joined the movement, he added.

He said they would stay in the square until their demands were met.

“We upheld the slogan of the youth revolutions, we won’t allow any flag into the square other than the Palestinian flag,” he said.

The same principle is governing the coalition’s demonstration in Ramallah, where protesters insist only the national flag will fly.

As more and more people arrived at the Gaza City sit-in, there was a party-like atmosphere in the square, with youngsters waving flags, singing national songs and chanting slogans.

Huge loudspeakers blasted tunes from a popular Lebanese singer as young people stood around chatting or put up tents, some lounging on mattresses.

There were few signs of the security forces, although a handful of police could be seen directing traffic around the square, an AFP correspondent said.

Some activists said the decision to start the mass protests a day early was taken for fear the Hamas-run security forces would close off the square or block roads in a bid to prevent the planned rallies.

But Samah al-Rawah, another of the March 15 organizers, said the decision to start early came after the Hamas Interior Ministry refused to give them a permit to protest on March 15, saying another group had already applied to hold a protest that day.

Organizers believe the permit was handed to a Hamas organization which is trying to co-opt the March 15 movement, which goes by the name The National Campaign for an End to Division.

“So we have started now because we don’t want any other Palestinian faction to steal this event. We will sleep here because we don’t want anyone else to take over the square,” Rawah said.

Earlier on Monday, Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh had ordered the Interior Ministry to let the rallies go ahead without interruption, his office said in a statement.

The premier, it said, “supports all the efforts by the young people and the factions which aims to end the division and protecting the… national unity of our people.”

Haniyeh ordered the ministry to ensure the security forces “created an atmosphere which would let these public events succeed.”

Later, a statement from the Hamas security forces said they would “work hard to protect these noble goals and will continue to keep the compass national and the public away from hateful partisanship that some people are trying to make up to poison the atmosphere.”

Since the outbreak of massive protests in Egypt, Hamas security forces have clamped down on numerous demonstrations. Last week, they detained 11 “unity” protesters and interrogated those believed to be behind the Facebook campaign.

( / 14.03.2011)

Het ongebreidelde racisme van Wilders

Geert Wilders heeft weer een dankbaar onderwerp gevonden om zijn hetze tegen de islam en moslims nieuw leven in te blazen. Vorige week, op 11 maart, werd in de illegale nederzetting Itamar nabij Nablus in de door Israël bezette West-Bank een joods gezin vermoord. De daders zijn niet bekend, maar de Israëlische autoriteit gaat ervan uit dat het Palestijnse terroristen waren. Minstens twintig Palestijnen zijn inmiddels gearresteerd in het naburige Awarta. In de omgeving van Nablus is het al jaren onrustig en zijn er voortdurend gewelddadige conflicten tussen de kolonisten en Palestijnen.

Gruwelijke beelden van het vermoorde gezin, waaronder een baby van drie maanden en twee jonge kinderen gingen over het web en maakten, logisch, veel woede los. Overal braken relletjes uit en gingen woedende bewoners van de illegale nederzettingen de straat op en vernielden eigendommen van Palestijnen. 24 uur na de afschuwelijk moordpartij kondigde de regering van Netanyahu aan dat in reactie op de ‘terroristische aanslag’ er 100 nieuwe woningen gebouwd worden.

Uit niets is bekend of deze moorden islamitisch gemotiveerd waren, maar omdat er een kans bestaat dat de daders wellicht moslims zijn — die kans is groot als het Palestijnen zijn — ziet hij hierin het bewijs dat de Islam niet deugt. En Palestijnen deugen immers ook niet, want die zijn volgens hem naast moslim ook nog eens een verslagen volk en verdienen het om vernederd te worden.

Alhoewel ieder spoor van de daders ontbreekt weet Wilders dat de aanslag islamitisch was. Het gaat niet om bewijzen, het gaat hem om de waarheid. Zijn waarheid die diep racistisch gemotiveerd is, zo blijkt maar weer. Voor Wilders is iedere misdaad waarbij een moslim betrokken is het bewijs van Islamitisch fascisme. Dat maakt iedere moslim medeschuldig aan de misdaad van een willekeurige moslim.

Er worden vrijwel dagelijks kinderen en families op gruwelijke wijze vermoord, overal, ook in het ‘vrije’ westen. We horen Wilders echter nooit wanneer Palestijnen en hun kinderen worden vermoord. Als er een gezin in Nederland of elders wordt vermoord dan heet het een familiedrama. Als de daders moslims of immigranten waren dan is hun motief blijkbaar anders dan wanneer het om anderen zou gaan. Niet de moord is de misdaad maar het moslim-zijn. Net zoals vroeger de jood, communist, homoseksueel, of neger.

Je vraagt je af wat dan het motief van niet-moslims is, wanneer zij iemand vermoorden. In het paradijs van Wilders zijn alle moslims fascisten en alle fascisten eigenlijk goedbedoelende burgers zoals hij. In de strijd van gewone mensen voor vrijheid en recht en tegen onrecht in het Midden-Oosten ziet hij het bewijs van islamisering. Zijn subtiele racisme bestaat uit medelijden met slachtoffers van daders afkomstig uit door hem zo gehate bevolkingsgroepen. En omdat zijn politieke macht gebouwd is op zijn acteertalent als slachtoffer wordt zijn ongebreidelde racisme geen strobreed in de weg gelegd.

( / 14.03.2011)

Why Palestinians will protest on 15 March

Rawan Abu-Shahla, The Electronic Intifada, 14 March 2011

On 15 March Palestinians will demonstrate, calling for unity. (Luay Sababa/MaanImages)

We are a group of Palestinian youths who have come together for the sole purpose of leaving behind our political identities and affiliations, and deciding to put our best interests above all else, united under our Palestinian flag. We have called for peaceful demonstrations on Tuesday, 15 March across the Palestinian nation — in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the territories of 1948 and the Palestinian diaspora, calling out together one slogan: “The people want to end the division!”

We call for peaceful actions in support of unity in the Palestinian political scene under one banner, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Division in the Palestinian body politic has affected every aspect of our lives: socially, economically, educationally and intellectually. It is ordinary Palestinians who have paid the price of the four-year long division that serves no one but the Israeli occupier.

Our campaign to end the division started out as a thought which stirred discussion, and some youths decided to give it a try and did everything possible to make this initiative happen. Day after day, the idea grew and became a plan and then a public decision to not be silenced anymore, not to be terrorized or oppressed and most importantly, not to be ignored and forgotten anymore. That is how we came to our decision to demonstrate on 15 March, state the public’s refusal of the status quo and the practices of the political “leadership.”

It is an idea so beautiful in its simplicity and purity, that all the political parties’ attempts to alter it, complicate it, or accuse those behind it of serving some subversive agenda, have failed. And after discovering that this is a genuine movement that reflects nothing more than the conscience of the Palestinian public being awakened, the political parties are in distress and confusion. To oppress or not to oppress? — that is the question they now face.

In recent weeks, we worked to spread the idea among the people, encouraging them to participate with their families, to trust that their voice will be heard once they raise it, and to trust each other and understand that we are all in this together no matter what political affiliations or beliefs we hold. We have sought to convince them that with unity in our call and in the field, we will vanquish the fear that is nesting inside us, and that when we stand together as one to claim or rights, no one can harm us or oppress us.

The peaceful 15 March demonstrations will be the start of a series of activities, and the first day of an open-ended sit-in. The main idea is that we’re staying until the political “leadership” wises up, subjects itself to the people’s demands and takes serious actions toward fulfilling them. What happens next is totally in the hands of the people.

This movement is from the people, and for them. As for Gaza Youth Breaks Out (GYBO), and all other participating groups working in the field, we have only the honor of initiative. All else now depends on how the Palestinian street responds, and on how strong they can be.

Things will be hard; there are threats, whether of violence from controlling parties, or fear of chaos. But we have complete faith in our call and in our people. We are betting on the patriotic Palestinian conscience to act up, and for all to learn to accept, respect and salute our differences, forgive the past and start anew, showing the world a true Palestinian example of tolerance. Our calls are peaceful and our only purpose is to restore the lost harmony in Palestinian society.

The campaign to end the division is a long-awaited public decision to move, and to cast away all the fears. There is a long list of reasons why people are so fed up and why they are going out to make their demands heard.

Palestinians have now come to understand that through their silence and submission to the political parties’ wills, through accepting to be manipulated and terrorized, they become accomplices just as guilty as the parties themselves.

The people are going out so that they will do their part in bringing change, and breaking out of the general air of indifference that has been filling our hearts for the past four years.

We Palestinians, with all our different backgrounds, will no longer be ignored. We will claim our rights as citizens and human beings to be respected, protected and recognized as the sole source of legitimate power. Our government must understand that we the people are a force to be reckoned with. We will not be deceived by speeches — we’ve had enough of those. We believe that actions speak louder than words and we, the Palestinian public, are doing our part with this initiative to give the “leadership” one more chance to earn our trust.

The day of a one-way relationship between the governors and the people will be, come 15 March, over.

The division among Palestinians must end. It has weakened our cause and instead of remaining the internationally-renowned symbol of a righteous and lawful struggle that it has always been, it has deteriorated into an illusion of authority and positions, allowing our occupier and real oppressor, Israel, to violate us. Israel continues to kidnap and imprison more innocent Palestinians without fair trials, to invade our territories, wreck our homes, uproot our trees, steal our heritage, bomb our cities and besiege the Gaza Strip for five consecutive years. Israel continues to violate UN resolutions without anyone holding it accountable. And with the lack of a proper Palestinian leadership, there will be no stopping Israel from doing what it wants.

So our message is clear and simple: end the division, turn to Palestinian public opinion and work for the prosperity of Palestinians to pave the way for the establishment of our democratic, independent Palestinian state. Unity is due.

Our call goes out to every Palestinian, be true to yourself, be true to your cause, be true to the sacrifices that our great people have given throughout 63 years of suffering. Go out on 15 March, denounce the division and anyone who stands by it.

Together in the name of our sacred cause, our martyrs and our prisoners, we call for unity under our Palestinian flag. There’s absolutely no doubt in our hearts that our peaceful demonstrations will be the dawning of a new Palestinian day, where every Palestinian feels that he or she belongs.

Rawan Abu-Shahla is a member of Gaza Youth Break Out and lives in Gaza

( / 14.03.2011)

De fictie van de PVV over Links

Rechtse mythes ontzenuwd

Het zal velen wel duidelijk zijn dat de PVV zich weinig aantrekt van harde feiten. Beeldvorming is belangrijker dan de waarheid. De PVV begrijpt het verschil goed tussen gelijk hebben en gelijk krijgen. Het nadeel van altijd maar de waarheid geweld aan te doen is dat op je op den duur door de waarheid wordt achterhaald. Zo ook de hardnekkige mythes over de massaimmigratie.

In een recent kamerdebat met Tofik Dibi moest de PVV toch schoorvoetend toegeven dat er van massa immigratie al jaren geen sprake is. De wet Cohen heeft zijn werk goed gedaan als het gaat om het afstoppen van de grote instroom. De PVV betoogt nog wel dat er veel kansarmen binnenkomen, maar ook dat blijkt een duidelijke leugen te zijn. De kansarmen immigranten die moeilijk integreren blijken gemiddeld na 2-3 jaar al het land weer te verlaten. Het zijn juist de goedopgeleiden die blijven, aldus de integratie monitor.

Hoogleraar Leo Lucassen maakt via zijn website korte metten met de mythes die de PVV constant verspreid over de oorzaken van de grote immigratie instroom:

1. Dat Nederland wordt bedreigd door massa-immigratie en dat massa-
immigratie per definitie slecht is voor een samenleving
2. Dat de ‘linkse kerk’ de deur wagenwijd heeft opengezet voor laagopgeleideimmigranten uit Moslimlanden
3. Dat het minderhedenbeleid in de jaren 80 en 90 een links cultuur relativistisch experiment was en Nederland in de greep was van een multiculturele psychose, waardoor de integratie juist ernstig is vertraagd.

Mythe 1

Sinds de invoering van de wet Cohen is de migratie gedaald van bijna 50.000 onder rechtse kabinetten naar een negatief saldo van 6000 in 2006.

Het rapport van onderzoeksbureau Nyfer nam een wel heel ruime definitie van het begrip migratie om toch vooral Wilders zijn rapport te geven waarmee hij andere partijen kon afbluffen. Zelfs Rutte nam in de verkiezingscampagne dit rapport als uitgangspunt. Wie echter kijkt naar de cijfers van het CBS, welke mede gebaseerd zijn op de gegevens van de IND, komt tot een geheel andere conclusie. Zowel Wilders als Rutte hebben de zaak bedonderd.

In de cijfers zitten namelijk ook asielzoekers. Daarvoor gelden andere procedures en wetgeving. Daarbij zijn we afhankelijk van internationale wetgeving. De resterende groep immigranten blijkt overwegend hoog opgeleid. Precies de groep die Rutte juist wilt binnenhalen.

De werkelijke massa immigratie is de instroom vanuit andere EU landen. Arbeidsmigranten zogezegd. Echter deze groep kan niet gebruik maken van sociale regelingen en vertrekt zodra het werk over is. Van werkverdringing door deze groep is nauwelijks sprake. Zij doen vaak werk waarvoor geen autochtonen werknemers te vinden zijn.

Dat immigratie slecht zou zijn voor Nederland is feitelijk nooit aangetoond. De PVV schermt altijd wel met allerlei bedragen zoals in het rapport Nyfer, maar die dit zijn wel heel eenzijdige doorrekeningen zoals Nyfer ook heeft toegegeven. Als je namelijk alleen kijkt naar inkomenspositie, dan valt het grootste gedeelte van de Nederlandse bevolking af en is onrendabel. Om even terug te gaan in de tijd. Tijdens de Gouden Eeuw heeft Nederland volop kunnen profiteren dankzij immigranten die onze schepen bevolkten en ook in de steden zorgden voor ambachtelijk werk.

Mythe 2

Volgens de PVV heeft de linkse kerk de deur wagenwijd opengezet voor immigranten. Een grotere verdraaiing van de werkelijkheid is er haast niet. Tijdens de jaren zestig en zeventig waren de PVDA en vakbonden totaal niet gediend van immigranten. Links was toen bang voor werkverdringing en had zeer strenge voorwaarden gesteld aan immigratie. Na 2 jaar diende de immigrant weer huiswaarts te keren. Ook speelde voor de PVDA dat zij een beleid van bestedingsondersteuning uitvoerden. [Galbraith] Daardoor was de nederlandse werknemer duurder geworden voor ondernemers. Het openzetten van de grenzen zou een enorme werkeloosheid onder de autochtone bevolking veroorzaken. Daar was Den Uyl zich van bewust en hield de deur dicht.

Het zijn juist de rechtse partijen geweest die onder druk van ondernemers deze regels hebben versoepeld[kabinet van agt – wiegel] De ondernemers waren maar al te blij met deze goedkope krachten en waren niet gelukkig met het feit dat een werknemer al na 2 jaar terug moest. Eventuele investeringen in de buitenlandse werknemer werden hierdoor teniet gedaan.

De confessionele partijen, de voorlopers van het CDA, drongen aan op het toestaan van gezinshereniging omdat het gezin heilig is. Het gezin is voor confessionele de hoeksteen van de samenleving en de vreemdelingenwet mocht dat niet beperken.

Zodoende werd op 2 manieren de deur opengezet door Rechts nederland. De VVD liet de immigranten langer blijven en het CDA zorgde ervoor dat de vrouwen en kinderen konden overkomen naar Nederland. Daarmee legde deze 2 rechtse partijen de basis voor het integratie drama. Met Links had dit allemaal weinig te maken.

Mythe 3

Dat de integratie is mislukt door Linkse experimenten berust ook al niet op feiten. Er was ten eerste sprake van brede steun onder de 2e kamer, waarbij het beleid vooral was gericht op het wegwerken van achterstanden. Ten tweede werd dit beleid ingevoerd door de rechtse kabinetten na Den Uyl. Dus de kabinetten van Agt/Wiegel waren hiervoor verantwoordelijk. Zo werd de Minderhedennota uit 1983, met de bekende slogan ‘Integratie met behoud van de eigen identiteit’ onder verantwoordelijkheid Hans Wiegel, destijds minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, naar de Kamer gestuurd.

Het liberaal manifest uit 1981 vertolkte het beleid waarop nu zoveel kritiek is: „De overheid dient aan culturele minderheden een zo groot mogelijke gelegenheid te geven tot integratie in de Nederlandse samenleving en daarbij dient hun recht op behoud van een eigen culturele identiteit te worden veilig gesteld.“. Dit is dus het standpunt van de VVD onder Wiegel. Deze verklaring werd opgesteld nadat al bekend was dat de immigranten niet huiswaarts zouden keren. Het is dus de VVD geweest die de multiculturele samenleving breed uitdroeg en aanmoedigde.

In 1991 verklaarde de toenmalige VVD minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen:

“Ik heb ervoor gestreden dat hiervoor extra geld beschikbaar kwam en regelgeving tot stand kwam. Ik was en ben erg vóór de minderheden. Ik heb destijds gezegd en ik zeg het nog, het mag voor de kansen van een kind niet uitmaken of het uit Alkmaar of Ankara komt.”

Gedurende zijn lidmaatschap voor de VVD in de 2e kamer werd het beleid van de VVD in deze, gesteund en uitgedragen door Wilders. Hoe anders is de opstelling van de PVV nu. Nu kan het zijn dat Wilders tot inkeer is gekomen, al vindt Bolkestein dat hij geradicaliseerd is. Het blijft verbijsterend dat meningen tot feiten worden verheven en er weinig tegengas is in de media om dit tegen te spreken.

Het stuk van Lucassen maakt zaken een stuk duidelijker en ontzenuwd haarscherp de mythes die door rechtse partijen krampachtig in stand wordt gehouden. Het nemen van enige verantwoordelijkheid voor het eigen beleid en handelen is voor rechtse partijen not done. Liever geven ze de schuld aan derden. In dit geval linkse partijen.

( / 13.03.2011)

Dispatches From Tahrir

Inside Egypt’s revolution and the last days of Mubarak

By Ashraf Khalil
March 03, 2011

On Thursday January 27th, 2011, Safwat El Sherif, the secretary general of Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party, convened an abrupt press conference in the NDP’s headquarters along the Nile, just outside of Tahrir Square. 

Egypt had just witnessed its largest anti-government protests in a generation and more unrest was on the way. Protest organizers were calling for a massive turnout the following day, and everybody was feeling fired up by the sight of Tunisians hounding out their own longtime dictator Zine al Abidine Ben Ali earlier in the month. Clearly some sort of government response was called for.

President Hosni Mubarak’s government couldn’t have chosen a more appropriate spokesman. Sherif is a quintessential regime crony, a former information minister whose ties to Egypt’s military rulers date back to Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Sixties. With his jet-black dye job and pancake makeup, the guy just looks like an old-school fascist pimp.

He didn’t disappoint either, delivering a medley of NDP greatest hits – a 15-minute string of clichés that didn’t begin to approach the reality on the streets.

Sherif hailed the achievements of the NDP and Mubarak’s government – emphasizing socialized health care and education and the subsidized food and fuel. He made vague promises of “widening political participation” while simultaneously dismissing the street protesters as “a few thousand” and said that a loud minority shouldn’t be able to disrupt the lives of the happy majority. He never mentioned the word ‘Tunisia’ but made an apparent reference in saying, “We don’t imitate other countries. We are Egypt!”

At least five times, he unleashed some variation on, “The Party has its hand on the pulse of the youth.” Sherif concluded with a quote that should be engraved on his headstone: “Egypt is stable, God willing.”

Just over 24 hours later, the room that Sherif spoke from was in flames, and the historic Egyptian revolution was in full swing. If Sherif and his fellow NDP elders truly had their “hand on the pulse” of the people, they would have headed to the airport that night, because the people were baying for their blood.

The “Day of Rage” protests were the first nail in the coffin of Mubarak’s 29-year reign. On January 28th, protesters shattered the police state, defeated the Interior Ministry’s shock troops and took control of central Cairo’s Tahrir Square – pausing to gleefully burn down the NDP headquarters.

They wouldn’t relinquish their hold on Tahrir for weeks, turning the massive public space into a sort of militarized revolutionary utopia. Meanwhile Mubarak’s crumbling regime veered wildly between statements of arrogant defiance, half-assed concessions and, finally, increasingly beleaguered appeals for everybody to just go home.

Mubarak’s humiliating February 11th surrender, coming just one day after he pissed everybody off by publicly vowing not to leave, serves as a reminder of just how unstable these supposedly “stable” Middle Eastern societies can be. In the end, Mubarak’s regime was exposed as fragile, tone-deaf and intellectually bankrupt. At no point in the entire three-week whirlwind did the government seem to fully grasp just what was actually happening.

IF MUBARAK’S FALL was shockingly swift (given his tenure), the many seeds of his demise were years, if not decades, in the making. There were numerous forces that finally brought him down. But the short version is this: He and the people around him brought this on themselves. Mubarak’s apparently genuine confusion, and even hurt, at all the hatred being directed towards him served only to highlight just how completely detached he had become from the realities of the people living in the society he helped shape.

The various crimes of Mubarak’s era are still being unearthed; widespread low-level torture and rampant corruption will certainly top the list. But as modern dictators go, he would struggle even to make the Top 10.

He was never as violent or sadistic as Saddam Hussein, not even close. His longtime interior minister, Habib El-Adly, helped foster a culture of absolute lawlessness among the police and internal security forces. But there won’t be any post-Mubarak revelations of mass graves.

He was never as flamboyantly corrupt as some of his peers. Certainly, uncounted billions disappeared into the coffers of Mubarak and his cronies. But it all seemed to go to nice villas in gated communities outside of Cairo, beach houses on the Mediterranean coast and overseas bank accounts.

One editor called me recently to ask for examples of over-the-top extravagance on the part of Mubarak’s family and inner circle. He wanted something outrageous, on par with Imelda Marcos’s shoe collection, or Uday Hussein’s bizarre sex parties. There is really nothing to offer on that level.

Instead, Mubarak’s ultimate crime will be treating his people with contempt – openly disrespecting them for so long that many Egyptians lost both respect for themselves and their ability to change anything that was happening around them.

Mubarak’s 29 years in power had a genuinely corrosive effect on Egyptian society and psychology. He took a proud and ancient civilization and presided over the virtual collapse of its citizens’ sense of public empowerment and political engagement. He taught them how to feel helpless, then made them forget they had ever felt any other way.

Several successive generations were instilled with the belief that the system was indeed rotten to the core, but that there was nothing anyone could do about it. Anyone who tried to change that dynamic was regarded as a noble fool. Egyptians were taught to “walk next to the wall” – translation: Keep your head down, feed your family and don’t stick your nose in affairs of governance that are above your station.

Egypt under Mubarak, particularly in the last 15 years, became a more cutthroat place. Rule of law was replaced by the law of the jungle. The causes: economic desperation and the vivid daily reminders that there was one set of rules for most and a completely different set for a select few.

The end result was a dramatic erosion of public morality and the trademark Egyptian sense of community. The idea of justice or equal treatment under the law became laughable. In all disputes, big or small, the issue of right or wrong became secondary to the all-important wasta – connections or influence.

But if the first 29 years of the Mubarak era helped kill Egyptians’ self-confidence and sense of their own political empowerment, his last 18 days in power witnessed a dramatic resurgence of both. When the protesters took lasting control of Tahrir, something was unleashed. Reservoirs of confidence, creativity and empowerment emerged which some feared had been lost forever. Seeing the Egyptian people regain that sense of dignity, pride and ownership was arguably the most amazing – and important – aspect of the entire pressurized three-week Egyptian Revolution.

What was truly astonishing to observers – within Egypt and overseas – of the events that transpired between January 25th and February 11th was just how fast everything moved, and how quickly the mood and tone shifted from day to day and sometimes hour to hour.

January 25

A group of young activists, depending heavily on social media, announced a day of mass protests, partially in honor of the successful Tunisian revolution 10 days earlier. The date was mischievously chosen because it was a national holiday: Police Day.

A Facebook page announcing the protests had commitments to attend from 80,000 people. But nobody was really sure just how many would turn out and where.

Anticipation was high for days beforehand, due to both the Tunisian uprising and the recent string of public copycat self-immolations in Egypt.

Organizers originally called for crowds to gather outside the Interior Ministry, near Tahrir Square. That turned out to be a ruse; around 10.30 a.m., the word went out through Twitter and Facebook about a whole new set of gathering points and contact numbers.

The turnout exceeded all expectations. A series of scattered protests moved through different parts of the city, growing in strength as they joined up with other groups and induced onlookers and residents to join in.

I spent the day moving throughout downtown Cairo trying to keep track of a dizzying series of fast-moving events. One group of marchers, moving through the Boulaq area, seemed to make a point of recruiting as they went. Protesters openly appealed to the sidewalk gawkers to join in and chanted, “Raise your voice/He that shouts won’t die!” (It sounds better – and rhymes – in Arabic).

Even among those who didn’t participate, there seemed to be a high degree of emotional support for the marchers. One chubby young mother carrying a wriggling toddler stopped to give the protesters a thumbs-up. Down the block, a grandma sporting no more than four intact teeth gleefully clapped and chanted along.

At one point, more than a thousand people stood outside a building on the Nile belonging to Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party and chanted “Illegitimate” and “Oh Mubarak, your plane is waiting for you.”

The black-clad riot troops of Central Security dutifully deployed in their usual overwhelming waves. But, for the first time in recent memory, the troops seemed outnumbered by the protesters, who simply pushed through their ranks. The Central Security guys looked completely miserable. They weren’t used to a fair fight.

Around 4 p.m., the crowds converged on Tahrir Square, the massive public space on the edge of downtown that’s the traditional heart of the city. The protesters filled up more than half the square, but the riot police began using tear gas and water cannons. A tense stand-off lasted for hours. Around 1 a.m., police violently cleared the square using volleys of tear gas and baton charges.

The day ended in defeat for the protesters, but the turnout had already surprised all sides and officially taken Mubarak’s regime into uncharted waters. Organizers called for January 28th to be a massive “Day of Rage” protest.

January 26-27

The protests started out smaller and more manageable, and riot police succeeded in keeping demonstrators largely penned in. But, late in the evening, violent clashes erupted on Ramsis Street. Protest organizers on Twitter urged demonstrators to keep the pressure on the stressed and fatigued Interior Ministry cadres. Meanwhile, news and images emerged from the canal city of Suez where much more violent confrontations left several police stations burned and parts of the city under the control of the protesters.

The first steps of what would become a near-total communications shutdown became apparent. On the 26th, access to Twitter was blocked, but tech-savvy protesters and journalists generally found ways to access the service. Late in the evening on the 27th, the government took an unprecedented step – shutting down the country’s entire internet service.

January 28

Around 10.30 in the morning, the final hand of the government fell as all coverage for cell phones in the country – including those with foreign sim cards – went dead. There were high expectations of serious violence.

Organizers, aware of the massive security deployment, simply told protesters to begin marching all over the city immediately after noon prayers. From the start, it was obvious the turnout would be beyond all previous numbers.

I joined an approximately 8,000-strong march starting from Moustafa Mahmoud mosque in Mohandessin district, across the Nile from Tahrir.

Some of the protesters came clearly primed for a fight, wearing swim goggles or carrying onions and vinegar-soaked cloths: both well-known treatments for tear-gas exposure. But the overall mood was jubilant and studiously non-violent. At one point, a single hothead protester started vandalizing a roadside McDonalds advertisement; the others quickly dragged him away, shouting “peaceful.”

What was striking was just how diverse the crowds were, and how many female protesters were there. In the span of 10 minutes on the same stretch of asphalt, I interviewed a Westernized young woman in her late 20s with fluent English, an angry tubby veiled lady in her 50s, a 31-year-old executive at a multinational corporation, and an impoverished kid named Mido who makes about $55 per month and who had to drop out of college because his family couldn’t afford to have him not working.

The clashes began at the mouth of the Galaa Bridge in Dokki. Central Security had completely blocked the bridge to prevent access to Tahrir Square, directly across the river. For two hours, starting around 2 p.m., security repeatedly scattered protesters with indiscriminate volleys of tear gas that engulfed the Giza Sheraton. But the demonstrators kept coming back. Those returning from the front lines were treated with onions, vinegar and other tear-gas treatments that I had never even heard of. As I emerged gagging into a side street, a man splashed some Pepsi onto my burning eyes; it immediately alleviated the pain, and by the end of the day I was carrying a Pepsi bottle myself, tending to others.

One of the most remarkable things about the Day of Rage is that it took place inside an information vacuum. On the 25th, half the protesters seemed to be constantly on their smart phones, either Tweeting or checking for news on what was happening across the country. But on the 28th, nobody knew what was happening anywhere else – not even on the other side of the river.

It didn’t matter. Protest organizers basically bypassed the idea of coordination altogether and just told people “Protest everywhere.” The government’s desperate move to strangle the flow of information didn’t hinder the demonstrators. Nor did it stop the journalists from communicating what they witnessed to the world.

If anything, the information vacuum may have ended up sharpening the wills of the demonstrators. With no idea of the situation anywhere else, protesters had no choice but to fight like hell for whatever public patch of ground they were standing on – and then fight their way through to the next patch of ground.

All through that day and deep into the night, Cairo reverted to a word-of-mouth storyteller society. If you were walking in the street and you saw protesters coming the other direction, you asked them where they were coming from and what the situation was like there.

Around 4 p.m., something amazing happened. The phalanx of Central Security troops broke ranks and ran, leaving their paddywagons behind. For a while it was hard to even grasp what had happened. Protesters gleefully spray-painted slogans on the trucks – some of which still contained frightened Central Security guys.

It was a powerful moment – the exact turning point when the police realized the people weren’t afraid of them and that they were woefully outnumbered.

There was a surreal interlude when Interior Ministry officers gathered impotently on the small bridge, while the protesters merely ignored them and surged past. I walked past one group of officers huddling around a walkie-talkie and heard one of them say, “Nobody’s answering.”

In an instant, the fearsome and hated bullies of the Interior Ministry had become pathetic and irrelevant. One middle-aged officer carrying a baton still hadn’t figured it out. He started yelling at a group of young protesters photographing the remains of the paddywagons. One passing demonstrator simply stuck a finger in the officer’s face and loudly shushed him. The officer stopped for a moment, thought it over and meekly withdrew.

By early evening, after a particularly violent battle on Kasr El Nil Bridge, the final gateway to Tahrir, the Interior Ministry had officially been defeated. Mubarak called in the army, which deployed around Tahrir and throughout the city, but the army troops made no aggressive moves against the protesters – many of whom happily climbed up on the tanks and APCs to pose for pictures.

Around midnight, Mubarak made the first of what would become a string of unsatisfactory half-concessions that completely missed the point of what the protesters were demanding. In a televised speech, he announced the dismissal of his cabinet. In Tahrir, about 10 minutes after the speech ended, most of the protesters found this hilarious. It was too ludicrous to even make them mad. As one man said: “Have you heard anybody this week shouting ‘Down with the cabinet?’”

January 29-February 1

A holding pattern ensued. The protesters tightened their grip on Tahrir Square, with several thousand vowing not to leave until Mubarak departed. Supporters brought in blankets, food, medicine, tents and cigarettes. One of the most common chants became, “We’re not leaving/You leave!”

Cell-phone service returned on the 29th, but the internet remained blocked.

The concessions from Mubarak continued. He appointed intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as his first-ever vice-president and ordered him to “open a dialogue” with the opposition. Given the diverse, leaderless, nature of the protests to that point, it’s a valid question whether Suleiman had any idea who to even call to start that dialogue.

The collapse of the police infrastructure and a series of prison breaks sowed fear among the citizens. Neighborhood watches instantly sprang up through the city to protect their districts. On January 31st, an Army spokesman publicly stated that the soldiers would not harm peaceful protesters – a huge relief to the Tahrir demonstrators who had watched the steady buildup of tanks and concrete barricades in recent days.

On February 1st, Mubarak delivered a second speech, this time promising not to run in presidential elections scheduled for the fall, but vowing to remain in office until then. He presented it as a chance to “finish my work in the service of the nation” and head into well-earned retirement.

His latest offer was immediately rejected by the majority of protesters but gained some traction among many Egyptians. Several people throughout the city told me they were happy to see Mubarak go, but saw no need for the former war hero to be humiliated along the way.

February 2-3

The regime played one of its final, and nastiest, cards. A series of pro-Mubarak rallies sprang up throughout the city on Wednesday, February 2nd, and gathered near Tahrir – where they abruptly coalesced into a thousands-strong mass of rock-throwing men who began laying siege to the square. The Tahrir protesters, whose ranks had thinned a bit at that point, were caught by surprise and they struggled to respond. Violent battles went on throughout the day and evening, with heavy casualties among the anti-government forces. Bizarrely, internet service returned just a few hours before the attacks, enabling the Tahrir protesters to send a barrage of frantic Tweets from the center of the maelstrom.

I made it into Tahrir around 3 p.m., and found the protesters paranoid, enraged, and a little scared. Crowds of Mubarak supporters were probing the multiple streets leading into Tahrir, seeking a soft way in; dozens of people were returning from the front lines heavily bloodied. Organizers with loudspeakers were summoning teams of young fighters to this or that intersection.

The protesters were convinced that their attackers were largely made up of plain-clothed officers from the police and State Security Investigations – basically the revenge-seeking remnants of the police state that had skulked away the previous week. They were determined not to break ranks and vigilant against the threat of infiltration by provocateurs. Everyone approaching the square was repeatedly frisked and forced to show their national ID card – which would show on the back if the holder was employed by the Interior Ministry. I watched as one man was apparently unmasked as an Interior Ministry employee; the crowd nearly killed him before others dragged them off.

The army’s behavior was particularly curious. For the most part, the soldiers stood back and watched the violence, fueling doubts in the crowds as to their true intention and loyalties.

On February 3rd, the pro-Mubarak forces didn’t attack Tahrir as intensely, but they secured the perimeter and blocked desperately needed food and medical supplies from entering. They also attacked just about every foreign journalist they could get their hands on. Dozens of journalists were assaulted that day by either pro-Mubarak thugs or ordinary citizens driven to paranoia by a state media that had been screaming for days about shadowy “foreign elements” stoking the protests.

I was attacked, along with several other journalists, while doing innocuous street interviews in the middle-class district of Dokki. An enraged mob punched me in the face several times, and I’m convinced it would have been much worse if a nearby army soldier hadn’t intervened.

The two-day spasm of violence backfired badly on Mubarak and his henchmen. It prompted an angry escalation in the language coming out of the Obama administration. What was worse, for Mubarak, it failed to dislodge the protesters from Tahrir, and only sharpened the demonstrators’ resolve. By Friday, February 4th, the thug squads had disappeared just as suddenly as they formed and massive crowds were streaming in to reinforce the beleaguered Tahrir hardcores.

February 4-10

The golden age of the Republic of Tahrir. Somewhere along the line, protester-held Tahrir Square became a heavily fortified mini-state. Protesters of widely divergent political views and social circumstances combined to create something truly unique. They organized divisions of labor, arranged their own security details and diligently cleaned up after themselves. I entered the square more than a dozen times, and every single time it was cleaner than the street outside my apartment in Giza has ever been.

Every day seemingly revealed new (invariably funny) chants and fresh details. Multiple stages were assembled for concerts, speeches and poetry readings; tent cities mushroomed. Somebody set up a pair of wireless internet networks called Revolution 1 and Revolution 2.

Just getting into Tahrir required running a gauntlet of multiple redundant ID checks and pat-downs by volunteer security wearing their own laminated badges on lanyards around their necks. I have never been searched so often, so thoroughly or so politely. During that final week, Tahrir Square was more secure than most international airports. The buoyant mood had also returned, after a traumatic and violent two days. Once you made it through all the security procedures, you were greeted by a clapping and cheering crowd welcoming you to “liberated ground.”

The protesters had survived – just barely by many accounts – a harrowing experience and emerged battered but on their feet. There was a feeling that the regime had played one of its few remaining cards and failed. They knew at this point that (barring some sort of Army-led massacre) it was just a matter of time.

On the night of February 7th, there came an iconic revolutionary moment. Wael Ghonim, one of the secret planners of the revolt, was released after spending 12 days in detention. A Dubai-based executive for Google, Ghonim had anonymously created the Facebook page “We are all Khaled Saieed” in honor of a notorious victim of police brutality. He had come from Dubai to take part in the first demonstrations, but disappeared into the bowels of the police state on January 28th.

Just hours after his release, Ghonim appeared on a popular satellite talk show on the independent channel Dream TV. His raw, painfully sincere performance mesmerized the country.

“We are not traitors,” he declared. “We did this because we love Egypt.”

Ghonim, 31, wept openly when informed of the estimated 300 protesters – mostly young people – who had been killed. “It’s not our fault,” he sobbed before abruptly leaving the studio. “It’s the fault of all those who are clinging to power.”

Ghonim’s interview was particularly crucial because, for many Egyptians, it represented the first real mainstreaming of the protesters’ message. And their true face. My elderly Egyptian aunties, for example, generally don’t read anything but the state-run Al-Ahram newspaper. But they all watch Dream TV.

February 10

A flurry of early evening developments stoked anticipation that this would be the night that Mubarak would finally surrender and announce his immediate resignation. State television announced that Mubarak would address the nation at 10 o’clock, and several respectable news outlets reported that Mubarak would resign.

Tens of thousands of deliriously happy protesters gathered to watch the speech on a projection screen in Tahrir. They would all be disappointed.

Mubarak delivered a long, whiney, recap of his achievements in the service of the nation, and vowed once again to stay in command until his term finished. In short, he offered absolutely nothing new.

As the president’s speech went on and he failed to say the magic sentence everyone was waiting for, a sense of stunned realization settled over the crowd. Even the dozen soldiers clustered on top of a nearby tank watching the speech seemed grim.

About halfway through Mubarak’s message, One guy yelled out: “Does that look like someone who’s leaving? He won’t go until he’s removed. So we’ll remove him!”

The mood in the immediate aftermath of Mubarak’s speech was difficult to define – equal parts deflation, determination, and a mounting sense of pure rage.

“I feel hatred. I feel like we need to drag him from his palace,” said Mayada Moursi, a schoolteacher in her early 30s.

Twenty-five-year-old Mahmoud Ahmed, simply shrugged and said: “I feel like our president is stupid.”

February 11

Enraged and inspired by Mubarak’s enduring stubbornness, the protesters staked out new ground. One group moved to surround the Information Ministry a short distance from Tahrir – home of the state-run television channels. A second group of protesters made the several-mile trek to the presidential palace in the outlying district of Heliopolis. The army surrounded and secured each building, but made no move to disperse any of the protesters.

Finally, around 6 p.m., a grim vice-president Suleiman read a terse statement on state television. Mubarak had resigned and left power to the Supreme Armed Forces Council.

It was over.

ONE OF THE SAD FACTS of Mubarak’s final two weeks in power is that many of the concessions he offered under duress might have saved his regime and legacy, if only he had done so sincerely and years earlier. But by the time he was forced to deal honestly with his people, nobody trusted him anymore – and with good reason.

Mubarak had a chance to go out with grace, having genuinely placed the country on a road to true democracy.

Instead, his final years were marked by a regression so obvious that it was as though Mubarak and his government had stopped even trying to disguise it. Two of the most shameful moments of the Mubarak era came within its last year: the murder of Khaled Saieed in June 2010 and the ludicrous parliamentary elections in November.

Saieed, a 28-year-old small-time businessman in Alexandria, was dragged from a neighborhood internet café and assaulted by two plain-clothed police officers. The motivations for the attack are still murky, but Saieed’s family and friends claimed at the time it was because he posted a video online showing police officers dividing up the spoils of a recent drug bust.

Watching the video in question, you come away with more questions than answers. It definitely depicted a group of senior police officers jovially congratulating each other in front of a desk loaded with large bricks of hashish. Bizarrely, they all seem aware they are being filmed by what appears to be a cell-phone camera. But just why the officers allowed themselves to be filmed or how such damning footage ended up in the hands of Saieed remains unclear.

Whatever the motivations, the known facts of the Saieed case are this: on June 6th, just days after Saieed posted the video, he was forcibly dragged from the internet café and brutally beaten in front of multiple witnesses. He died from his injuries and images of his badly mangled face rocketed around the Egyptian internet, while several witnesses spoke out to the country’s independent press.

The ensuing furor touched off weeks of demonstrations around the country. That public anger was only magnified by a pair of shameful coroner’s reports that blindly backed the police claim that Saieed had choked to death on a packet of drugs he swallowed when he saw the officers coming.

In sweeping the Saieed issue under the carpet, Mubarak’s government helped lay the seeds for its own demise. Ghonim’s “We Are All Khaled Saieed” Facebook page became one of the main gathering points for organizers of the protests that eventually brought Mubarak down.

The incident also helped politicize untold numbers of Egyptians, touching a deep and powerful societal nerve and resonating among ordinary citizens who probably had never considered attending a demonstration before.

In late June, I attended a protest in Saieed’s name in Alexandria against police brutality. When I pulled out my notebook and identified myself as a reporter, I was literally engulfed by people clamoring to tell me their own personal tales of injustice and mistreatment at the hands of the police. I could have written down a dozen examples, ranging from harassment and intimidation of political activists to Mafia-style shakedowns and casual everyday humiliations.

Last month in Tahrir square, I met Amal, a young affluent mother who admitted she never cared about politics until the Khaled Saieed case.

“That really got to me. I have two boys and I felt he could be one of my sons,” she said. “That was a big turning point here.”

Just months after Saieed’s death came the November 2010 parliamentary elections, providing yet another glaring public reminder that the needs and desires of the people were irrelevant to Mubarak’s government.

After months of angrily insisting to the world that Egypt could conduct free and fair elections, Mubarak presided over one of the most widely decried votes in the nation’s modern history.

Paid civil servants were bussed in en-masse to vote for NDP candidates. Local election monitors and representatives of non-government candidates were barred from entering polling stations. In electoral districts across the country, the ballot boxes themselves were in the sole hands of the security forces – essentially making them the property of the NDP.

The final results were borderline comical and an international PR disaster for the NDP. No opposition party, even those regarded as close to the regime, secured more than a handful of seats. The powerful Muslim Brotherhood, which captured 88 seats (20 per cent of the People’s Assembly) in the 2005 elections somehow magically dropped to zero in the space of five years.

It was, for many Egyptians, the last straw – final, definitive, proof that this government was incapable of ever reforming itself. Mubarak’s legacy will be of a leader who cared so little about his people’s feelings that he felt safe actually showing them the game was rigged and daring them to do something about it.

Other authoritarian regimes are no doubt studying the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions for notes on how to better manage their people and avoid the fates of Mubarak and Ben Ali. But that approach will miss the true message of what happened here.

The real way to stay in power in the new Middle East is much simpler: Behave yourself, don’t get too comfortable and stop treating your citizens with contempt. Over the past month of interviewing protesters, I heard just as many calls for basic dignity and respect as for fuzzier concepts like freedom and democracy. Mubarak and his regime didn’t just take away his people’s freedom; he took their dignity. But the people, in the end, forcefully took it back – robbing Mubarak of his along the way.

( / 13.03.2011)