EQB march for sick prisoner, Murad Abu Moleq

EQB march for sick prisoner, Murad Abu Moleq

Al Qassam website- Gaza- Members of the Ezzedeen Al Qassam Brigades EQB have marched in Gaza City on Sunday in solidarity with a sick prisoner held by Israel.

After evening prayers, gunmen with the al-Qassam Brigades marched from a mosque in Nuseirat refugee camp in Central Gaza Strip to the home of Murad Abu Moleq.

Abu Moleq recently underwent colon and bowel surgery in an Israeli hospital.

He was detained in 2001 while taking part in a jihad mission against Israeli soldiers and was shot during the arrest.

Murad Abu Moleq was sentenced to 22 years.

Father of Murad Abu Moleq holding a picture of his son dedicated by Al Qassam Brigades.

(Source / 05.06.2013)

IOF soldiers storm Al-Khalil villages

IOF soldiers storm Al-Khalil villages

Al Qassam website- Al Khalil- Israeli occupation forces (IOF) stormed a number of villages south west of Al-Khalil at dawn Tuesday and broke into and searched many homes.
Eyewitnesses told the PIC that IOF soldiers burst into four villages, south of Doura town, and searched and ransacked many houses.

They said that other IOF units patrolled Marah Al-Baqar hamlet with no arrests reported.

The witnesses said that IOF soldiers set up roadblocks near the settlement of Negohot established on Palestinian land south of Al-Khalil and examined IDs of passersby. Another roadblock was set up at the entrance to Beit Uwa village.

(Source / 05.06.2013)

Israelis oppose Jerusalem as capital

Palestinian youths and Israeli settlers (background), from the nearby settlement of Ofra, clash following a demonstration against the expropriation of Palestinian land by Israel. Picture: AFP

ISRAEL – Three-quarters of Israelis oppose the idea of any part of Jerusalem becoming capital of a Palestinian state, a poll showed on Wednesday as Israel marked 46 years since the 1967 Six Day War.

And less than one in 10 would back the idea of a Palestinian state within the lines that existed before the outbreak of the war on June 5, 1967 when Israel seized east Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The survey, published in the Jerusalem Post newspaper, showed that 74 percent were against the idea of the Palestinians having the capital of their future state in any part of Jerusalem, with only 15 percent in favour of dividing the city.

Two thirds, or 67 percent, said they were in favour of a two-state solution to end the conflict with the Palestinians, while 33 oppose it.

And of those in favour, only 8 percent would agree to the Palestinian demand for a state within the 1967 lines.

Washington is currently engaged in a major push to rekindle peace talks after a hiatus of nearly three years, with the Palestinians pushing for a state within the 1967 lines and east Jerusalem as their capital.

Although Israel has accepted the idea of a two-state solution, it wants all of Jerusalem to remain united under Israeli sovereignty.

It also wants to keep hold of the main settlement blocs where most of the 500,000 Jewish settlers live.

Of those in favour of a two-state solution, 40 percent said they wanted Israel to keep the major settlement blocs – Gush Etzion, Ariel and Maaleh Adumim.

And 19 percent said they would back moves to annex Area C, which covers more than 60 percent of the occupied West Bank, in order to keep hold of the settlements.

The poll, which questioned 500 Jewish Israelis — half of them secular and half of them religious — was carried out on Monday by Rafi Smith Research and has a 4.5 percentage point margin of error.

The figures showed sharp differences between the two types of respondent. Of those in the secular camp, 83 percent were in favour of a two-state solution, while 72 percent of the religious respondents said they were against it.

The Palestinians were also marking the anniversary of the Six Day War on Wednesday, which they refer to as the Naksa, or “setback” when they remember the losses sustained during the conflict.

(Source / 05.06.2013)

EU Refuses to Name Hezbollah “Terrorist”

British attempts to blacklist Lebanese resistance movement end in failure

The UK government has failed in its desperate attempt at the European Union to blacklist the Lebanese resistance movement Hezbollah as a “terrorist group”, local media reported.

The failure came after Britain was unable to convince its European allies that Hezbollah was behind an attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria last year, according to British media outlets.

The bombing happened last July in the Black Sea resort of Burgas, where five Israeli tourists, a Bulgarian driver and the bomber were killed.

This was considered as a crucial part of the UK government’s rationale to convince the EU to blacklist Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.

However, several EU countries voiced doubt over the evidence linking the resistance movement to the bombing.

Hezbollah enjoys a major political and social standing within the Lebanese society and the EU nation also voiced concerns that blacklisting it could create instability in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, after a one-year probe, the Bulgarian government too was unable to submit credible proof that Hezbollah was involved in the attack.

“An attack takes place and immediately all over the world, governments are saying it was Hezbollah,” said Elena Pavlova, a Middle East analyst based in Sofia. “Yet, we have waited a year and still no one has given any proof.”

Along with local journalist Ruslan Yordanov, she found al Qaida-linked martyrdom videos online, claiming responsibility a day after the bombing in Burgas. They wonder whether evidence pointing towards alternative perpetrators was deliberately ignored to meet the demands of Israeli and Western governments seeking an excuse to ban Hezbollah.

Hezbollah has also dismissed allegations of involvement in the Burgas plot, and the attempt to blacklist the resistance movement has brought heated responses from Lebanon.

“Any listing of the group as a terrorist organisation will be considered as political provocation,” Lebanon’s acting foreign minister Adnan Mansour, who is seen as close to the Syrian government, said last week. “We know there are Israeli pressures practised on more than one international side in order to accuse Hezbollah of terrorism.”

Enough doubts remain to make several EU governments uncomfortable about blacklisting the group, and the support of all 27 members is needed for the motion to pass.

(Source / 05.06.2013)

Het nieuws van 5 juni van de werkgroep Deportatieverzet

Het nieuws stroomt binnen bij de werkgroep Deportatieverzet en de beerput van het migratiebeleid begint steeds harder te stinken. Hier updates over de uitzettingen naar Guinée met vervalste Laissez-Passers, de DJI die loog om de arts geen toegang te geven tot N – afgelopen maandag gedeporteerd – en de rechtszaak van meneer Bah, die tot twee keer toe in detentie zwaar mishandeld werd en nog steeds in hongerstaking is.

Maar eerst: Yasir, de tiener die afgelopen maandag werd gedeporteerd naar Afghanistan. Het is hem vanochtend gelukt om vanuit Afghanistan contact op te nemen met de onafhankelijk arts. Wij hebben hem geprobeerd terug te bellen, maar op dit moment is de telefoon onbereikbaar. Zodra we Yasir spreken zullen we verslag doen van hoe het nu met hem gaat en wat er precies tijdens de deportatie met hem gebeurd is.

Geen papieren? Dan vervalst het Ministerie ze wel!
Op 10 mei werden een 20-tal Guinese Laissez-Passers uitgegeven om vluchtelingen naar Guinée te deporteren. Maar de ambassadeur van Guinée heeft inmiddels laten weten dat deze LP’s niet door hem zijn uitgegeven: de ‘consul’ die de papieren getekend heeft bestaat niet, de ambassade heeft geen LP’s verstrekt en op de lijst van vluchtelingen die gedeporteerd zouden worden, stonden twee personen zonder naam.
Issa Koulibaly, één van de Guinese vluchtelingen die met uitzetting middels een vervalst LP bedreigd wordt, is al geruime tijd in hongerstaking. Hij is één van de mensen die de zaak aan het rollen bracht. Er zijn Kamervragen over gesteld waar geen bevredigend antwoord op is gekomen, maar zijn uitzetting is nog steeds niet van de baan.
Een andere vluchteling is vanmiddag gedeporteerd naar Guinée, ook met één van de vervalste LP’s. Ondanks de expliciete verklaringen van de ambassadeur van Guinée, Ousmane Sillah, achtte de rechtbank in Amsterdam de bewijzen dat de LP’s vervalst zijn ‘niet zwaarwegend genoeg’. Verschillende Kamerleden hebben druk uitgeoefend op staatssecretaris Teeven, maar die vond het niet nodig om daar verder op te reageren.

Detentiecentrum Rotterdam: alweer op pertinente leugens betrapt
Afgelopen maandag werd N. naar Malta uitgezet. Twee dagen daarvoor had hij bezoek zullen krijgen van de onafhankelijk arts. Maar toen zij zich presenteerde bij het detentiecentrum, werd haar het bezoek aan N. geweigerd, omdat de advocaat van N. geen fax met een artsenverzoek zou hebben verstuurd. Vreemd, want de advocaat had wel degelijk van het detentiecentrum een ontvangstbevestiging gekregen, mét daarin het tijdstip waarop de arts meneer N. zou kunnen bezoeken.
Gelukkig heeft de advocaat de fax goed bewaard en aan ons gemaild: het bewijs dat detentiecentrum Rotterdam voor de zoveelste keer obstructie van medisch handelen heeft gepleegd en keihard gelogen heeft.

Rechtszaak meneer Bah
Op verzoek van meneer Bah zelf laat zijn vertrouwensarts het volgende weten: “Morgen om 10.10 vindt de zitting plaats bij de rechtbank in Zwolle, aan de Schuurmanstraat 2, betreffende zijn detentieplaatsing.
Aangezien meneer onuitzetbaar is vecht zijn advocaat, mr. Lit, zijn plaatsing in vreemdelingendetentie aan. Dhr. Bah is volhardend in zijn hongerstaking en verzwakt maar zal wel bij de zitting aanwezig zijn.”
Meneer Bah werd tot twee keer toe in de afgelopen weken ernstig mishandeld door bewaking en het Intern Bijstandsteam – de knokploeg van het detentiecentrum.
We hopen dat sympathisanten bij de rechtszaak aanwezig kunnen zijn om meneer Bah zo te laten zien dat hij niet alleen staat in zijn protest!

(Source / 05.06.2013)

De prijs van liefde

By Marianna Laarif

Een boer had enkele jonge hondjes die hij nog moest verkopen. Hij schilderde een advertentie op een bord met: 4 puppies te koop en zette dit aan het begin van zijn erf aan de kant. Net toen hij de laatste spijker in het bord sloeg werd hij aan zijn overal getrokken. Hij keek naar beneden in de ogen van een kleine jongen. “Meneer” zei de jongen, “Ik wil een van uw puppies kopen”. “Wel”, zei de boer, terwijl hij met zijn hand achter in zijn nek wreef, “deze puppies hebben hele goede ouders en kosten aardig wat geld”. De jongen liet voor een moment zijn hoofd hangen. Toen reikte hij diep in zijn broekzak en haalde een handvol kleingeld voor de dag en liet het aan de boer zien. “Ik heb 39 cent. Is dat genoeg om te kijken?” zei de jongen. “Zeker”, zei de boer en hij floot een deuntje. “Dolly !”, riep hij. Uit het hondenhok en over het erf rende Dolly naar de boer toe gevolgd door 4 kleine bolletjes wol. De kleine jongen drukte zijn gezicht tegen het hek. Zijn ogen straalde van verrukking.Terwijl de honden naar het hek toe kwamen rennen, zag de jongen nog iets bewegen in het hondenhok.
Langzaam verscheen er nog een bolletje wol, maar deze was zichbaar kleiner dan de andere hondjes. Op zijn achterpootjes gleed het bolletje het hok uit en op een wat onhandige wijze begon het hondje vooruit naar het hek te hobbelen terwijl het zijn best deed de andere hondjes bij te houden. “Ik wil die hebben”, zei het kleine jongetje, terwijl hij naar waggelende hond wees. De boer knielde naast het jongetje neer en zei: “zoon, je wil dat hondje echt niet. Het is nooit in staat om te rennen of te spelen zoals de andere hondjes kunnen”. Toen deed de jongen een stap naar achteren, reikte naar beneden en begon een broekspijp op te rollen. Terwijl hij dit deed werd een stalen beugel zichtbaar aan beide zijden van het beentje van de jongen die vastgemaakt zaten aan zijn speciaal gemaakte schoentje. De boer aankijkend zei hij: weet u meneer, ik kan zelf ook niet zo goed rennen en hij heeft iemand nodig die hem begrijpt”. Met tranen in zijn ogen reikte de boer naar beneden en pakte de kleine puppie op. Hij hield het heel voorzichtig vast toen hij de puppie aan de kleine jongen gaf. “Hoeveel kost het?” vroeg de kleine jongen. “Niets, het is gratis”, zei de boer. “Er is geen prijs voor liefde”.

Palestinian youth mark anniversary of Six Day war

JERUSALEM (Ma’an) — Palestinian youth on Wednesday marked the 46th anniversary of the Six Day war, mourned by Palestinians as the “naksa” or setback, with a demonstration in Jerusalem.

Protesters raised Palestinian flags and raised signs reading “Revolution is born from sorrow” and “Jerusalem is the capital.”

Dozens of Israeli officers were present at the protest and took photographs of demonstrators.

Israeli forces occupied Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem in the 1967 war.

(Source / 05.06.2013)

Hamas: Illegal for PA premier to form new government

GAZA CITY (Ma’an) — The Hamas-run government in Gaza said Wednesday that tasking new PA Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah with forming a West Bank government was illegal.

The “formation of a new government proves that the Fatah leadership is willing to maintain and prolong the state of disagreement,” a statement released after a weekly Hamas cabinet meeting said.

Newly appointed premier Hamdallah said this week that he would announce a new 24-member Palestinian Authority cabinet on Thursday.

As the new government will only serve until August, Hamdallah said he would make only minor reshuffles to the cabinet, keeping most of the ministers who served in his predecessor’s administration.

Hamas warned of the “dangerous plots” of US Secretary of State John Kerry, saying that he is preparing to flood the region with more “pledges and illusionary” plans.

Kerry’s initiatives will undermine Palestinian rights and provide security and protection to the “occupation state,” Hamas added.

However a political adviser to the Hamas prime minister said he supported Hamdallah’s selection despite the Gaza government’s opposition to forming a government unilaterally.

Yousef Rezka told Ma’an that Hamadallah had the academic vision and experience to form a national unity government. He added that Hamadallah could prove his impartiality by re-opening Hamas offices in the West Bank and releasing all political prisoners.

Rezka added that Hamas rejects the appointment for legal reasons, because the government was supposed to be a unity government which included Hamas.

(Source / 05.06.2013)

Egypt warns ‘all options open’ on Ethiopia dam

Egyptian policemen stand guard outside the Ethiopian embassy on June 2, in Cairo.

CAIRO (AFP) — Egypt will demand that Ethiopia stop construction of a Nile river dam and warned “all options are open” if it harms its water supply, advisers to President Mohamed Mursi said on Wednesday.

“It is Egypt’s right to defend its interests,” said Ayman Ali, one of Mursi’s advisers, in comments carried by the official MENA news agency.

“Other people have a right to seek their own interests. But there must be guarantees that the Ethiopian dam will not harm Egypt, otherwise all options are open,” he added.

Presidential adviser Pakinam El Sharkawy said Egypt would demand that the upstream country end its construction of the dam.

The presidency has said the dam is a “national security” issue for Egypt.

“Demanding of Ethiopia to stop construction of the dam it intends to build on the Blue Nile will be our first step,” MENA quoted her as saying.

Egypt believes more studies are needed on the dam’s impact on its water supply which is almost entirely dependent on the Nile, although far more on the flow down the White Nile from the Great Lakes of East Africa, than that down the Blue Nile from the Ethiopian highlands.

Ethiopia has begun diverting the Blue Nile 500 meters from its natural course to construct a $4.2 billion hydroelectric project known as Grand Renaissance Dam.

The Blue Nile joins the White Nile in Khartoum to form the Nile which flows through Sudan and Egypt before emptying into the Mediterranean.

The first phase of construction is due to be finished in three years, with a capacity of 700 megawatts. Once fully complete, the dam will have a capacity of 6,000 megawatts.

Egypt believes its “historic rights” to the Nile are guaranteed by two treaties from 1929 and 1959 which allow it 87 percent of the Nile’s flow and give it veto power over upstream projects.

But a new deal was signed in 2010 by other Nile Basin countries, including Ethiopia, allowing them to work on river projects without Cairo’s prior agreement.

(Source / 05.06.2013)

The conflict over Palestinian legitimacy

 

'neither Fatah nor Hamas monopolise legitimacy alone, without one another'‘neither Fatah nor Hamas monopolise legitimacy alone, without one another’

The large controversy caused by Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi’s visit to Gaza as the chairman of the International Union for Muslim Scholars’ delegation is not a new phenomenon in the Palestinian arena. The PA, the PLO and left-wing factions have treated all political visits to the Gaza Strip with coldness and dismissal on the grounds that they deepen Palestinian division and violate the legitimacy some believe is represented by the PLO alone.

The Palestinian Authority and other Palestinian parties have expressed their discomfort of the Qatari Emir’s visit to Gaza last year, and it seems that the need for diplomatic dealings has lessened the expression of discomfort towards the visit. This was not the case during Sheikh Qaradawi’s visit which was greatly criticised, and included statements abusing the Sheikh made by PA and Fatah spokespeople. These statements claimed that the Sheikh obtained a forged Palestinian passport, although it was actually a gift given as a token of appreciation for his position on the Palestinian cause.

The Palestinian arena is also expected to witness similar tension when the Turkish Prime Minister makes his scheduled visit to Gaza, which has sparked controversy before it occurred. This became apparent when the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, urged Erdogan to refrain from making this visit, which the Turkish Foreign Ministry responded to by saying that Turkey will do as it pleases and will not allow any other party to interfere in its policies and diplomatic relations.

However, the matter did not end there. It seems as if the pressures have reached a presidential level, which can be concluded through Erdogan’s statement made during the joint press conference with the US President in Washington, in which he said he would be visiting Ramallah, along with the Gaza Strip.

Why do political visits to the Gaza Strip spark so much controversy? Why does Fatah and the PLO strongly fight them? Why is Hamas encouraging such visits?

A new old conflict

The key word that answers the aforementioned questions is “legitimacy”, as what the Palestinian arena is witnessing today is a natural extension of the conflict over Palestinian legitimacy between Hamas and the PLO. This conflict started when Hamas became a part of the national resistance in 1987 and an important player in Palestinian politics and revolution, as well as a potential competitor for Palestinian legitimacy, which has been monopolised by the PLO since Fatah gained control of it in 1969.

Moreover, what intensified this conflict was the popularity gained by Hamas in record time, as well as its significant participation in the first Intifada, and its execution of its own activities. These activities were far from those of what was known as the unified leadership of the Intifada, which, at the time, consisted of a number of PLO factions.

However, the conflict took on a more intense political and security dimension after the legislative elections in 2006, which explains the clashes and provocations following Hamas’s victory in the elections and the formation of its government. This ultimately led to military action which was resolved in Hamas’s favour in the Gaza Strip, leading the conflict over legitimacy to an unprecedented phase that continues until today. This drives us to study the different elements making up the Palestinian National Liberation movement’s legitimacy.

Historical legitimacy

Historical legitimacy is an important element in establishing legitimacy for any national liberation movement. Such legitimacy is based on recognising the role of the authority or faction leading the revolution, as well as establishing a public opinion that believes in the national right to oppose the enemy, opponent, or occupier.

It is certain that Fatah, as well as the left-wing and national Palestinian factions, possess such legitimacy, as these factions participated in the launch of the modern Palestinian revolution in 1965, as well as in transforming the PLO into an armed entity seeking to liberate Palestine.

Moreover, these factions, spearheaded by Fatah, contributed to the formation of the Palestinian national entity and to the achievement of great military and political victories, despite its failure to achieve the Palestinian National Liberation movement and PLO’s ultimate goal in other various arenas, which is the liberation of Palestine and the return of the refugees, as well as their compensation.

However, historical legitimacy loses much of its importance when the revolution gradually transforms into a state, which is confirmed by the history of the world’s revolutions, such as the case of General Simon Bolivar, liberator of Latin America, and Thabo Mbeki, Nelson Mandela’s deputy president. The history of their struggle did not protect Bolivar and Mbeki, who were unable to continue to sit on the throne of legitimacy after the revolution became a state.

Although the Palestinian revolution is still-theoretically-on-going, as it has not achieved any of its main goals, the Oslo Accords and the authority it produced, has led to the formation of a hybrid between a revolution and state, which has led to the decline in importance of historical legitimacy in the Palestinian National Liberation Movement and contributed to its destruction, though it has not yet fully ended it.

In exchange for this destruction of Fatah’s and the PLO’s historical legitimacy, a new historical legitimacy is being gained by Hamas, who has worked on the formation of its own historical struggle for over 25 years, which is a little over half the entire duration of Palestine’s modern revolutionary history.

Revolutionary legitimacy

Revolutionary legitimacy is closely linked to historical legitimacy since it is based on the revolutionary history of a certain authority or faction. However, it differs from it because it is not only limited to the past performance of this faction or leader, but also includes the continuity of the revolutionary work as long as the goals of the revolution haven’t been realised.

It is well known that Fatah has a considerable revolutionary history throughout the history of the modern Palestinian revolution, as the Palestinian left-wing forces contributed to providing the Palestinian national project with its revolutionary momentum throughout the difference stages of the project’s history. This is especially true during the early stages of the revolution, until it left Beirut in 1982. This means that these movements, led by Fatah, won revolutionary legitimacy in many stages of modern Palestinian history.

The same applies to the Islamic Jihad movement, which has provided revolutionary models from its inception to the present day, but it is different from other Palestinian factions because it adopts a more radical attitude towards the conflict with the Israeli occupation, thus gaining a revolutionary legitimacy that cannot be overlooked in the Palestinian equation.

As for Hamas, it has also executed revolutionary resistance that must be accounted for. Even though it emerged late in the arena of Palestinian revolutionary work, it also constituted a difficult figure in the equation of the Palestinian revolution since its establishment until the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This represented a quantum leap in the history of the movement, as after the Intifada, Hamas became the greatest actor in the field of Palestinian revolutionary work, especially after the death of Yasser Arafat, Fatah’s adoption of the strategic option of negotiations under Abbas and the rejection of all forms of revolutionary work, with the exception of public resistance.

Hamas was able to gain a growing amount of revolutionary legitimacy after turning the Al-Aqsa Intifada into a revolutionary act based mainly on the effort of armed factions, as the movement was able to play a major role in the Intifada after this transformation.

However, Hamas’s control of the Gaza Strip in 2006 put the movement in an objective position, making it the leader of the revolutionary work in the area. This was a pivotal moment for increasing the movement’s revolutionary legitimacy through three stages:

Steadfastness in the face of the Israeli aggression in 2008/2009, the ability to capture the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and exchange him for about a thousand Palestinian prisoners, and the achievement of a clear victory in the war waged by the occupation in the November 2012.

Returning to the Fatah movement, it is clear that its revolutionary legitimacy is at stake in light of its adherence to the option of peaceful negotiations, and not even being able to implement of the Popular Resistance program, which it adopted in two consecutive meetings of the movement’s Revolutionary Council.

Electoral legitimacy

With the gradual shift of the revolution to a state, constitutional or electoral legitimacy has started to slowly take the place of revolutionary or historical legitimacy. This means that the revolution’s founding history and the achievements of the struggle throughout the history of this revolution, will no longer be sufficient to acquire legitimacy for any of the national work factions. Instead, this history must be supported by electoral legitimacy through the ballot box, and must be based on the constitutional principles governing states in the modern era.

The late President Yasser Arafat was aware of this matter and responded to the requirements of the Oslo Accords by developing the Basic Law or a Palestinian constitution that dictates the relationship between the government and the people, and adds a constitutional and electoral legitimacy to the historical and revolutionary legitimacy which is achieved through the people’s votes in the ballot boxes.

It is known that the Fatah movement has been able to support its historical and revolutionary legitimacy after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority through electoral legitimacy, as the movement, and its historical leader, Yasser Arafat, were able to achieve a clear victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 1996, in light of Hamas and a number of PLO factions’ boycott of the elections. Fatah also continued to preserve its electoral legitimacy after the death of Yasser Arafat, after its candidate, Mahmoud Abbas, achieved an electoral victory qualifying him to succeed Arafat as president in 2004.

However, the legislative elections held in January 2006 led to the division of electoral legitimacy amongst Fatah and Hamas when Hamas won a large majority of seats in the Legislative Council, which qualified it to head the government and share power with the presidency, as dictated by the Amended Basic Law. This fuelled the conflict over legitimacy between Hamas and Fatah, and deepened the crisis rather than contribute to the solution.

The Palestinian division, which was the inevitable result of the conflict over legitimacy, led to the fuelling of this conflict, in practice, by hindering new elections that may contribute to solving the crisis of legitimacy, at least its electoral aspect. This division formed the substance of the dispute between the conflicting parties, as each party claims to possess electoral legitimacy, while the truth is that both legitimacies, the presidential and parliamentary, are the subject of dispute after the President’s and Legislative Council’s legal terms ended. However, each party is trying to interpret the laws in a way that serves their purpose in this conflict.

All that is left to be said is that neither Fatah nor Hamas monopolise legitimacy alone, without one another. Although historical legitimacy is in favour of Fatah, revolutionary legitimacy is leaning towards Hamas at the moment, and both movements possess partial electoral legitimacy. This means that Hamas cannot claim to fully represent the Palestinian people on its own, and Fatah does not have the right to monopolise this representation. Moreover, neither movement has the right to fight the political and economic support of the Palestinians in Gaza under the pretext of the unity of representation and legitimacy.

(Source / 05.06.2013)